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Bridging the Divide: A comparative analysis of the feminist 
movement in Turkey and the United States 
This is still a working paper of my senior honors thesis and is the most updated version. However, all 
research for this project has been completed, only minor edits remain. The final draft will come out on 
March 15th, but I cannot in good conscious call this a final draft until my committee deems the project 
completed. 
Women's diverse experiences in the context of globalization has been a recurring theme 
throughout my academic career. How do women in their daily lives, reconcile the seemingly 
irreconcilable? My interest in this subject took me to Turkey for a year to study the unique 
process of democratization and its effects on women's rights. At some point, I had a realization 
that led me to write his paper. While there, I found myself accepting the perspectives of Islamic 
women as feminist, regardless of the extent to which I agreed with those perspectives. I had 
never had that experience with Christian women in the United States. In fact, I found it difficult 
to wrap my head around the idea of Christian feminism at all. This is likely due to my own social 
position as a secular liberal feminist in the United States. Christian women's perspectives are 
often presented in the United States as being in opposition to liberal secular feminism. My 
personal response to Islamic feminism was different because I saw Islamic women creating new 
forms of feminism that challenged Western notions in general. 
My reaction to Christian feminists helped me understand how secular Turkish women 
orient themselves towards Islamic feminism. Ideological divisions that exist in Turkey I argue 
are similar to those in the US. The most significant similarity is the particular political debate 
over women's rights. As a result, both nations have similar contemporary problems in building 
solidarity exist, despite the clear differences in the organization of civil society. Both the U.S. 
and Turkish feminist movements post-1980 have experienced a rise in conservative religious 
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right while political debates have become polarized. In both countries the discourse around 
contemporary issues, such as those surrounding abortion and headscarf debates, developed in 
such a way that women's rights are trumped by an ideological battle between religion and 
secularism. 
The objectives of this paper are threefold: First, to demonstrate how pro-religious women's 
perspectives in both Turkey and the United States have been effectively marginalized from the 
women's movement; second, to pinpoint the two polarizing debates of abortion and the 
headscarf, showing how they have divided women along ideological lines; and thirdly, to argue 
that women must move away from these polarizing debates as they no longer present a clear 
means for the progression of women's rights. To do so, women must begin to find commonality 
while acknowledging that their personal ideological position is not the 'end all be all' of 
women's rights. Often, "factions with the most power inevitably try to create the illusion that 
theirs is the only possible interpretation of reality" (Ingersoll 2003, p.8). My argument attempts 
to move beyond these particular debates and provide a means for secular and pro-religious 
women to build solidarity and progress the cause of women's rights. 
Women's bodies and identities become a battleground for these contested ideologies and 
thus marginalize certain groups of women whose "thick," particularistic positions are attached to 
these issues.! Pro-religious women of both countries, "who call themselves feminists are not 
readily accepted by the larger feminist movement as ideological kin" (Ingerso112003, p.34). 
Many pro-religious women do not explicitly identify as feminist, yet incorporate feminist values 
into their lives. These perspectives, whether explicitly feminist or not, are equally valuable in the 
1 'Thick'v. 'Thin' identities will discussed more thoroughly later on. 'Thick' identity however is referring to the 
non-primary identity of the other. 
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pursuit for gender equality. The resulting arguments and political positioning within these two 
debates creates particularistic 'thick' labels of women, often having little to no basis in the reality 
of women's attitudes and practices. Religion as an ideology is not the sole oppressor of women, 
while secularist policy been proven to guarantee women's rights in full. 
The debates as they stand today provide limited means for the progression of women's 
rights through generating any action toward their resolution no matter which ideological side one 
falls. Currently, women in both countries are fighting a battle that is not their own. Women's 
rights are now secondary to an ideological struggle, they can no longer deliver a satisfactory 
means for the development of women's rights. Moving away from the political sphere and these 
particular debates will allow women to build solidarity across 'opposing' identities. Negotiating 
around contested debates, building solidarity as women will provide an avenue to achieve 
common goals of women's rights. If successful, the ability for individual to find agency and take 
control of political debates. 
This paper will at times reveal my personal leanings toward secular feminism; however, that 
should not detract from my primary argument that women must place equal value on the diverse 
perspectives of women. I recognize that mine is the dominant perspective of both countries and, I 
contend, that the secular perspective has not been adequately challenged by pro-religious 
women. I am a feminist with strong opinions, but I, "may admit the possibility that [my) opinion 
may be false, [s/)he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is 
not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not as a living 
truth" (Mill, line 21). Therefore, my argument focuses on finding a means of debate for women 
through which building solidarity is possible. 
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In both countries, literature exists that shows how debates over abortion and headscarves 
have been severely polarized along ideological and political lines, further indicating that these 
ideological divisions do not, in reality, exist for the average citizen. In the United States it has 
been shown that, liberal secular and conservative religious are inadequate labels for expressing 
the political beliefs of a multidimensional electorate (Treier & Hillygus 2009, p. 683). In Turkey, 
the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) is considered by some as, populist social 
constructionists' who create a national narrative that best suits their ideological position, not the 
perspectives of the citizenry (Siizen 2008)2 Others have pointed out that the headscarf debates 
are based on the ideological positions of political parties through which women begin to take 
sides (Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012). These two political debates regarding women's rights have 
become what I consider, 'stalemate debates.' Defined as political debates in which the subject 
matter of women's rights merely becomes a symbol for distinct and opposing sides to argue their 
position. Because of this, actual progress on the issue carmot be realized and it halts compromise 
by obscuring commonality. Most importantly, while the political polarized sides may have a base 
in the electorate, they certainly do not represent the multidimensional opinions of the vast 
majority. 
The reality that a polarized political perspective cannot represent the majority is even 
clearer when analyzing women's complex identities. As Manning (1999) and Jelen (2011) state, 
many conservative religious women integrate feminist values into their public or professional 
2 The same is true for the founding Kemalist elites who constructed a particular national narrative in which women's 
rights had a starring role - as the bearers of democracy. 
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lives, without necessarily labeling it 'feminism.'3 For example in the United States, pro-religious 
women tend to strongly support workplace equality legislation whereas secular women may tend 
to focus on reproductive justice. In Turkey, many pro-religious women work on issues of 
domestic violence, education, empowerment and access to higher education. The reality in both 
countries is that women have comparable experiences and often share common goals that 
transcend current political categorization. Knowing that many women have common interests 
and share feminist values, why have political conversations so thoroughly divided women in 
each country? Comparing the organizational differences of civil society and similarities in 
"single-issue" polarized debates will shed light on how women can move beyond one issue to 
find solidarity. Once women find common ground they can decide for themselves the issues 
relevant to women's rights and progress can be made. 
To frame my argument, I contend that socially constructed group differences (even if they 
form oppressive structures) does not exclude the possibility of individuals being able to negotiate 
to change this very same structure. Perhaps even using those very structures to negotiate 
alliances and gain access to needed resources. "Philosophers Taylor (1989), Young (1990), and 
Kymlicka (1995) illustrate that admitting the socially constructed nature of group differences 
does not preclude organizing around the identities that mark those groups" (Bernstein, p. 50). 
The first reason being that abolishing base group identities is difficult and will not happen in a 
time span that would allow individuals to resolve contemporary issues. In addition, focusing on a 
far end goal of creating change outside identity groups may lead individuals to ignore current 
3 This broad definition is used to make a clear cross-cultural comparison between pro-religious/secular feminist in 
the United States and Turkey. Since Turkey's feminist movement is much smaller and has experienced a different 
political history than the United States, I am using many of their feminist movements concepts and finding 
correlating groups within the United States. 
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issues and inequalities between identity groups. Individuals will then be better able to work 
within identity groups and around oppression. 
Some theorists argue against the continued use of identity politics. One author, Wendy 
Brown, described by Bernstein, contends that the base culture of identity groups are formed 
through marginalization, creating oppressive structures. Therefore, "She contends that 
advocating for rights based on marginalized cultural identities will only lead to the increased 
social regulation ofthose groups by dominant groups that control the state"(Bemstein 2005, p. 
50). Essentially, Brown is arguing that because identity groups are formed through 
marginalization and are tools of coercive powers, they cannot be instrumental in being a catalyst 
for social change.4 Bernstein continues by arguing that base identities are created and 
maintained to oppress various groups and that working within those boundaries can only 
reinforce that oppression. 
This paper, however, finds it hard to imagine action based upon these objections. These 
base identities persist throughout contemporary life, politics and our understanding of the 
'other.' Structures influencing or assigning identity have not become less oppressive as groups 
have chosen to ignore them; rallying around them can only cause more women to be aware of 
those oppressive forces. "Some social movements of the oppressed have challenged the ideal of 
liberation as transcending group difference and have asserted instead the positivity of group 
based experience"(Young 1987, p. 639). Affirming rather than oppressing social group difference 
is essential to negotiating around normative structures which oppress various groups. "By 
asserting [these 1 politics, groups redefine the meaning of difference so that it no longer means 
4 I'm aware that these debates exist within the feminist movement. However, to make my point clear that women 
need to move beyond stalemate debates, I am taking the side that identity can serve as a means for organization. 
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exclusive opposition and deviation" (Young 1987, p. 638). By this acknowledgement women can 
find agency within their constructed identities. Co-opting the meaning and power behind those 
identities to create a community and foster a more effective social movement. One in which 
women see it's affects in their lived experiences.s 
Fisher-Onar and Paker (2012) provide a framework for understanding tensions between 
"thick" particularistic identities and "thin" principles. They investigate how individuals can live 
together despite particularistic differences. This paper will be using "thick" or particularistic to 
identify secular and pro-religious identity while "thin" will be used to identify 'woman' as an 
identity. 6 In a time when the process of globalization is weakening the influence of borders 
among societies, they question whether a cosmopolitan framework can produce a platform which 
would allow women to unite around a common identity through mutual recognition of difference 
(Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012, p. 2). The practical realities is that too often cosmopolitanism 
glosses over the serious tensions and contestation between "thick" particularistic positions and 
"thin" principles. However, the often comparable experiences of women under various 
patriarchal structures is a strong 'thin' principle, one that is a force for unity. 
As I will show in this paper, when analyzing the abortion and head scarf debates in the 
political sphere "thick" identities are not quite as polarized in the general populous. In stalemate 
debates, "ideological constructions often seem clear-cut and simple, the demands of the modem 
5 However, this is not emphasizing innate 'feminine' characteristics that are different from innate 'masculine' 
characteristics in which a balancing of the two equally would be ideal. Rather emphasizing the historical social (and 
sometimes oppressive) construction of femininity and womanhood, which can be used as a point of commonality 
between biological women to form the basis for a group based social movement; allowing women to find 
commonalities while negotiating particularistic identities within the social movement. 
6 These labels are derived from Seyla Benhabib (1992), The generalized and the concrete other. In this she describes 
the two perspectives of viewing the other, each have flaws. In the Generalized, we view the other as an individual 
(or citizen) that is entitled to the same rights as our self. Yet, this understanding hides the particularistic aspects of 
the self. With the Concrete, we view the other as just the opposite. Thc other is different, separate from the self, this 
hides the (generalized) commonality the self and other may share. 
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world require a level of fluidity," that a thick v. thin analysis can provide (Ingersoll 2003, p.l6). 
Tensions between "thick" identities exist on some level this tension may be generally 
exaggerated. Negotiating around particularistic identities may be possible if individuals take 
seriously the tensions between particularistic identities, "Cosmopolitan citizenship can transcend 
the commonly posed dichotomy of particularistic identity claims versus universalistic citizenship 
rights" (Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012, p. 3). Meaning that, women's diverse and particularistic 
identities can be used as a starting point for discussion and deliberation, women may be able to 
see beyond the generalized other and find true commonality. An analysis using "thick" v. "thin" 
will allow us to think beyond dichotomous identities and understand how "thin" identities 
interact with "thick" experiences which create overlapping and divergent communities of 
women. 
David Held and Aihwa Ong have both argued, though differently, that new global structures 
have created new challenges for current nation-state governance and concepts of sovereignty. 
"contemporary processes of globalization and regionalization create over lapping networks of 
power and interaction" (Held 2003, p. 466). Nations and social movements need to begin 
working with the understanding that, "overlapping communities" and identities exist in the 
modem world. As Fisher-Onar & Paker (2012) have noted, global forces that are changing 
individuals understandings of citizenship are particularly salient for women. It is because of 
women's diverse, 'thick' identities and 'thin' experiences as women creates most experience and 
therefore have a foundation for mediating 'overlapping communities.' 
Ong has argued that the, "Penetration of global forces has affected the relations between 
state and society, also changing people's understanding of their investments in state power and 
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the different possibilities of citizenship depending on one's relations to market forces" (Ong 
2000, p.57). Ong states that depending on an individuals location in a zone of graduated 
sovereignty, citizens are treated differently. Despite criticism of global solidarity, she recognizes 
that within these zones, the disadvantaged find opportunity in the fissures of sovereignty. Thus, 
even in the most critical perspectives of global solidarity there exists 'fissures' which women can 
build solidarity cross - identity. 
Case Studies: Abortion and Head Scarves as Divisive Symbols 
Processes of globalization demand that we study groups of women within their 
particularistic national and regional identities to build mutual recognition and understanding. It is 
possible that by studying women's cultures and historical backgrounds we may find comparable 
interests as women and begin to build bonds of solidarity. The case studies of the United States 
and Turkey that I will now present show the comparable experiences of women cross-identity as 
well as cross-border. While we may not think to compare these two countries due to their very 
different histories, there is a surprising similarity in the recent history of their feminist 
movements. Both countries saw the early development of the women's movement create tangible 
legal change, yet this change remained accessible only for an elite group of women (Gordon 
2002; Arat 1997). In the American context this presented itself as a socio-economic divide, in 
Turkey it was reinforced through a national myth of the 'citizen woman,' lalcite policy, and 
suppression of the women's movement after 1930. 
Post - 1980s both movements saw a change in the political geography of their respective 
countries, as the far right organized religious conservatives and moved into mainstream politics. 
The United States movement had two decades to organize itself, gaining some political clout. In 
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contrast, feminists in Turkey expanded into the public sphere at a time of political upheaval and 
in the wake of a military coup. With the entry of a religious right into the political spotlight, 
ethical debates over women's rights coalesced into ideological debates of secularism, religion, 
democracy and modernization. The abortion debates in the United States and headscarf debates 
in Turkey have revealed how women have become divided along ideological lines that have no 
bearing on the complex realities of women's attitudes and practices. 
Each of these debates in their respective countries have guaranteed that women are now 
fighting a lose-lose battle. The debates have become ideological fight between religion and 
secularism. Regardless of who 'wins,' neither can guarantee the development of women's rights. 
On the one hand, Religion can be viewed as an ideology and one that can be used or manipulated 
to oppress women. It is true that to focus on this variety of religious freedom could reverse basic 
women's rights by denying them access to abortion or determining that they must present 
themselves in a particular manner. But these restrictions do not constitute the complexity of 
oppression. A perspective such as this does not distinguish between religion as a faith and 
religion as a political ideology. On the other, secularist policy does not always provide the full 
development of women's rights. To create effective change in the majority of women's daily 
lives, we need to step back from these debates and fully understand the complexity of women's 
experience. This might be our only option for building solidarity and common interest among 
women. 
Historical Differences and Similarities 
The development of both feminist movements (in the U.S. and Turkey) can be viewed in 
comparable 'waves,' or time periods in which the movement was especially active. Generally 
what is considered the first wave of both movements consisted of women who strove for the 
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right to vote and access to education. In Turkey, some people include late Ottoman era women 
circa 1860 into the first wave of feminist women. However, generally the first wave of women 
are considered Kemalist, starting at the founding ofthe republic in 1923 up to 1940. This time 
period is what Yildiz Ecevit call the, "Formative years of the Republic" (2000). In the United 
States many consider the first wave as starting with the Seneca Falls convention of 1848 as the 
right for women to vote was ratified in the Declaration of Sentiments. Women gained the right to 
vote in 1920 and the first wave is considered to have extended up to 1930. In what Ecevit calls a 
"stagnation period," both movements diminished in strength between 1935 and 1960. In Turkey, 
this was due to the tight control the Kemalist state had over civil society. Once women's rights in 
Turkey had been granted to an extent that was consistent with democratic principles, the 
movement as an autonomous entity was suppressed. The reason for the diminished movement in 
the US was due to a series of factors. Partially the organization of civil society that allowed 
women's organizations to diffuse along single issues and partially due to the economic downturn 
of the great depression. 
The First Wave of Feminism in Turkey 
Turkey took on a modernization project which speaks to the powerful influence of western 
liberal thought. After succeeding from the Ottoman Empire in 1923 they abolished the Caliphate, 
created the Turkish language to replace Arabic and implemented strict la¥cite secularism, 
suppressing ethnic and religious minorities in the name of 'modernity' (Ecevit 2007). Founder, 
leader and creator of the powerful and still existing Republican Peoples Party (CHP), Mustafa 
Kemal Atatiirk is often portrayed as a hero and social constructionist of the nation.7 It was the 
7 CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican people's party that was exclusively in power until 1950 (Co~ar & 
Gen90g1u-Onba~1 2008). To this day it remains a dominant political party and has extensive support from the 
military. 
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Kemalist ideology of secularism, nationalism and modernization that pushed Turkey to adopt 
Western characteristics within a Turkish cultural context. Women's representation in the public 
sphere was held as a beacon of progress in modernizing Turkey (Arat 1997; White 2003). Their 
equality and status in society was used as a tool to prove the legitimate democratization of the 
new nation. 1925 was the year that women got the right to vote in Turkey. Just a year later the 
secular Swiss Civil code was adopted which created a legal framework abolishing polygamy and 
giving women rights to initiate divorce, seek education and professional career. 
Yet, these rights were given to women by a state that valued it's image of a 'secular Turkish 
democracy' over women's rights. As Ataturk himself said, "Republic means democracy, and 
recognition of women's rights is a dictate of democracy; Hence women's rights will be 
recognized" (Arat, 1997). Women, who had begun to organize at the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, who had furiously campaigned for suffrage were Given a certain amount ofrights by an 
authoritarian government (White 2003). The catch for women was that exercising their rights 
was a duty to the modernization project of the State. Hence, any women's rights organization or 
identity outside the purview of the state was condemned. 
Under the national narrative of the New Turkish Woman the identity of 'citizen woman' was 
created. This new 'citizen woman' was an urban, educated and socially progressive woman who 
never dressed in traditional Ottoman clothes (White 2003, p. 146). The conceptualization of 
'citizen woman' had a twist. While elite women were given access to education and the public 
sphere, the other side was that once married women's duty was to provide a modem household 
(White 2003; Arat 1997). The majority of women who internalized this duty were urban, well 
educated Turkish Kemalist women, an elite upper class of women who had started the founding 
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era movement (White 2003; Arat 1997). Non-urban, often religious or minority women failed to 
see the modernization project have any real affect in their daily lives. The republican feminism 
that grew out of the founding era only improved the lives of a small elite group of women, in 
tenus of education and participation in the public sphere (Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012, p. 7). Early 
on one can see the exclusionary attitude of the state influencing who was given access to the 
legal rights of' citizen woman.' 
Suppression of Feminism in Turkey 
After the push for suffrage, the women's movement in Turkey experiences a 'stagnant 
period.' The Women's movement in Turkey post 1940 was effectively suppressed as the Kemalist 
propagated the myth that women's rights had been granted. exampled in 1923 when women 
appealed for the foundation of the Republican Woman's Party, they were almost immediately 
denied (Co§ar & Gen~oglu-Onba§l 2008; Arat 1997). Later in 1935 the Turkish Woman's 
Federation was shut down because all women's rights had been granted and there was no need to 
organize. Best conceptualized by Kandiyoti, "men gave social birth to the new woman of the 
republic" (1997, p. 123). This placed serious limits on the ability for the feminist movement to 
expand and diversifY in a collaborative way both in the public and private realm. 
The feminist movement of Turkey entered into its stagnant years. Political women's groups 
were explicitly banned, yet the 40s saw some women's philanthropic groups expand. It was not 
until the mid 60s that the women's movement began to enter the public sphere. In what Ecevit 
calls the 'Restless Years,' it was a gradual movement that pretty much exclusively represented 
profession women. Building associations such as, the Association of Turkish Jurist Women. A 
small group of women during this time argued from a distinctly feminist perspective, stating that 
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debates about 'women's issues' should put women at the center (Ecevit 2007, p. 193). The 70s 
saw the proliferation of left-wing organizations that promoted women's rights. The most widely 
organized women's group in Turkey, The Association of Progressive Women (APW) was 
established in 1975. The APW adopted a Marxist - feminist perspective and was "an active 
supporter of women's struggle for their everyday economic demands and their struggle for 
equality, democracy, progress and peace" (Ecevit 2007, p. 194).8 Despite relative success of the 
APW it was banned after the 1980 coup due to its socialist ideals. However the coup's 
suppression of far left (and far right) groups allowed for the proliferation for an autonomous 
center left women's movement that gained national attention. 
The United States First Wave of Feminism 
In the United States, the first wave was recognized as the suffragist movement, gaining the 
right to vote for all women along with other legislative changes. Early on in the movement, 
amongst the turbulence of reconstruction and abolition, women attempted to argue for their right 
to vote based on liberal principles of democracy. Unlike Turkey however, the suffrage movement 
in the United States was greatly influenced by pro-religious women, most notably the Quaker 
Lucretia Mott. Pro-religious women along with Mott, 'Justified claims for women's rights with 
references to the Scripture and natural rights doctrines" (Marilley 1997, p. 11). In stark contrast 
to these women, famous early feminists, like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, argued that organized 
Christianity relegated women to inferior and 'unacceptable' positions (Marilley 1997). Although 
often working together and pursuing the same goal of suffrage, their ideological rational differed 
greatly. At the time, two national women's suffrage organizations existed, the National Woman 
8 Despite being fairly radical, these far left-women still propagated the Kemalist notion of a secular polity. They 
viewed traditionalism and conservatism as the main oppressor of women. 
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Suffrage Association (NWSA) Led by Stanton and the more conservative American Woman 
Suffrage Association (A WSA). 9 Ultimately, these two organizations joined forces to push for 
women's right to vote. 
Similar to Turkey's early movement, the core ofthe women's movement consisted of elite, 
upper class, (often) secular and highly educated women. However in Turkey, elite verse rural 
women became correlated with secular verse pro-religious. The major divisions amongst women 
of this time were race and class and historically these social divides had remained the most 
visible and exclusionary within the movement (Marilley 1997). Many secular and pro-religious 
women disagreed on arguments for women's rights, even if they agreed on the end goal. The 
diversity of voices within the US movement itself was still limited (Gordon 2002; Simon & 
Danziger 1991). Pro-religious women of the time were outspoken and often collaborated with 
secular women, their religious based arguments supported feminist notions of equality. Despite 
pursuing liberal goals, women of this movement were, "native-born, middle-class, white 
women" (Marilley 1997, p. 2). Because of this specific group of women, the push for women's 
right to vote was made under the arguments: no taxation without representation and democratic 
participation will make women better mothers and wives. 
The framing of this argument for women's suffrage indicates that many of the women in the 
early feminist movement were housewives of the upper class or rich women who had inherited 
land. In the United States, "They were usually the children of important men in their hometown, 
often college educated ... Their well-to-do backgrounds gave them both the freedom to 
9 In politics as well as feminist academia, pru1icular women's organizations are often used to describe the entirety of 
the movement. Feminist organizations have a distinct ideological and political positioning needed to operate in 
American politics. Describing the entirety of the women's movement through specific organizations further 
overshadows the diversity of women's opinions 
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experiment and the safety net to retreat into as they aged" (Gordon 2002, p. 134). Laws are still 
limited in changing women's daily lives is exemplified by the fact that only 20% of women in 
the United States voted in the first elections after the passing of the 19th amendment (Simon & 
Danziger 1991; Gordon 2002). The women of the early feminist movement gave legal rights to 
all women, but often due to their privilege, were the only ones who were fully capable of 
experiencing those rights. 
Women gained the right to vote in 1920 by the 19th amendment, often called the 'Susan B. 
Anthony Amendment.' Coalitions of liberal and conservative women worked together post-I920 
on a variety of women's issues, from child labor protections to universal disarmament (Rosen 
2000). Momentum of the movement soon slowed. Once women had gained legal rights, many 
scholars painted a picture of, The "New Woman." This woman that had gained the right to vote 
and now stood socially and economically equal to men (Freedman 1974). They praised the 
notion that women had been a positive force in history, ending their analysis at the end of the 
suffragist movement. Implicitly many thought legal rights were the key to equality, and 
discussion ended when those rights were achieved. Effectively the women's movement entered a 
dormant period, at least on the national stage. Some have argued that the women's movement 
didn't die after suffrage and become reborn in the 1960s (Verta 1989). The "stagnant period" was 
merely a pause or suspension in the movement, still containing some women's activism. Most 
recognize however that the question of women's realized equality did not begin to get asked until 
late 1950s. 
Entry a/Second Wave Feminism in the United States 
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In 1963 many women began to recognize their own discontent. The year Betty Friedan 
published the Feminine Mystique, although criticized for excluding black, poor and working 
women, her book revealed the previous decades inaction through middle class women's 
dissatisfaction with their roles as housewives (Rosen 2000). Unlike Turkey, this second wave of 
the movement gained significant political clout, their arguments for women's rights gained 
attention on the national stage. It was there feminist activists who recognized liberal political 
culture was inadequate to address the issues of women's daily lives (Rosen 2000). While there 
were tensions between factions of women in the leading organization (NOW), secular and pro-
religious women cooperated (Rosen 2000). By the 1970s, the new women's movement was in 
full swing and began to construct its own identity separate from the civil rights movement, 
becoming autonomous. 
The 1980s: Political Upheaval, Polarization and the Beginning ofIdeological Divisions 
In the wake of the 1980 coup in Turkey, many formal channels for political participation 
were closed as the coup attempted to calm the radicalization of both sides of the political 
spectrum (Arat 2000, p. 112). This gave way for the rebirth of a women's social movement to 
expand into the newly created political void. The feminist movement did expand and diversify, 
yet remained within particular boundaries predetermined by the Kemalist fathers. These feminist 
had grown to understand secularism as a pillar of democracy and modernization. They had seen 
earlier generations resist an authoritarian state, yet also saw secularist policy win the battle for 
public domain. Surprisingly, many secular feminists did not view the growing religious right as a 
threat, at least at first (Arat 1997). At this point in time there were certainly secular feminists 
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who sought mutual recognition with Islamic feminist, yet there was also a distinct faction of 
Kemalist women who viewed any religious perspective as the Islamization of society. 
The movement expanded, allowing room for more diversity while still internalizing many 
authoritarian secular ideas inherited from Kemalism. Prominent feminists of the time seemed 
fearful to leave the safety of a singular secular identity. "The parameters of this radical feminist 
activism were defined by Kemalism, the left, and the worldwide revival offeminism" (Arat 
1997, p. 107). These were the second wave feminists of Turkey, criticizing Kemalist state co-
option of their mothers movement, while still incorporating a secular left perspective (Fisher-
Onar & Paker 2012, p. 7). "Throughout the 1980s feminists had a negative attitude towards the 
state. This was mainly because they perceived the state as the main guardian of the patriarchal 
system" (Co§ar & Gen~oglu-Onba§l 2008, p. 330). Distrust of the government was compounded 
during this decade as center-right, moderate Muslim political groups began to dominate the 
political geography. Secular ferninists' feared their movement would once again become co-
opted by a religious center right government. 
The legacy of Kemalism the persisted in the feminist movement, admitting diversity within 
the boundaries of secular Turkish identities. Born out of political upheaval was the "Dress and 
Appearance Regulation," which prohibited certain dress in public agencies, offices and 
institutions (Olson 1985, p. 295). For men this meant no mustaches, beards, long hair and for 
women this meant no mini-skirts, low-necked dresses, and headscarves (Olson 1985; Kandiyoti 
1997). The year 1984 was when debates over the headscarf first entered the public and political 
sphere. Most famous of the cases that hit the newspapers that summer was Dr. Koru, an assistant 
professor of chemical engineering at Aegean University in Izmir (Olson 1985, p. 291). 
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Controversially she stated that her headscarf was part of her life philosophy, that she would 
rather be fired than take it off, that her constitutional rights were violated as the third article of 
the constitution in which freedom of religion is protected (Olson 1985). Further she insisted that 
the Dress Code was not being enforced for mini-skirts and revealing clothes, only for the 
headscarf.1o 
This case became particularly well known in Turkey, as Dr. Koru not only challenged her 
institution and the newly created Dress Code She challenged the national narrative of lalcite 
secularism. In reaction to this event, a local politician said that there was a "relationship between 
this matter and women's rights and religious attitudes [but] there can be no concessions that 
violate existing laws or Ataturk's principles" (Olson 1985, p. 293). A professor and former 
political party leader was noted as saying that personal philosophies are a threat to "social 
order" (Olson 1985).11 Many factions in Turkey at this time stressed that this was not really 
about women's rights or religious freedom, rather merely following the law because the law was 
created for societies development. Inherently this implied the headscarf and pro-religious women 
as a direct threat to the secular narrative of society. What ensued was a national ideological 
debate: Turkish nationalism v. muslim identity and secularism v. islamic society. 
As the ideological debate in politics flourished, women began taking sides on either side of 
the ideological divide. Secular and Kemalist feminists, embedded with the national narrative, 
viewed the headscarf as a political symbol of patriarchal religious oppression against women. 
10 There are distinct differences between the types of headscarves in Turkey. Most common is just a loose scarf 
wrapped around the head and tied under the chin, this is especially common for women in the east. The Hijab is a 
particular covering directly related to faith, specifically covering the hair but not necessarily anything else. In 
Turkey the 'Turban' for women is sometimes referred to, which is a variation of hijab that encircles the face and 
covers the neck. 
II Both politicians were associated with a center-right nationalist secular group. The first was specifically part of 
ANAP, Motherland Party at that time but since has merged with the Democrat Party (DP). 
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Pro-religious women on the other hand view their ability to wear the head scarf as a personal 
freedom, essentially feminist values in that they seek equality, agency and the capacity to 
exercise their legal rights. There are two main divisions within the secular camp that began to 
develop was between Kemalist and Radical feminists (Arat 2000). While Radical feminists to 
this day take a more sympathetic stance towards Islamic women yet still ultimately disagreeing 
with their overall ideology; Kemalist feminists openly protest the development of an Islamic 
women's perspective. Many Kemalist women dominated the conversation within the feminist 
movement, transforming their identity fully into feminists and re-inscribing Kemalist 
authoritarian stances. 
"For some time now, we have been confronted by a serious and surreptitious 
reactionary movement that hides behind the curtain of 'freedom of woman to 
dress as she wishes' but in reality struggles to retum our society to the 
darkness of the Middle Ages" (Arat 1997, p. 108; Aysel Eksi first president of 
The Association to Promote Contemporary Life). 
Women who called themselves Kemalist feminists understood the rising power of Islam as a 
serious threat to their established rights. By this time the feminist movement as a whole had 
separated themselves from the nationalist rhetoric, thus any argument in favor of secularism was 
seen as protecting exclusively women's rights (Arat 1997; Co~ar & Gen({oglu-Onba~l 2008). 
Because there was a sense of a linear modernization model, emerging religious views would send 
the country 'backward.' Secular feminists view their liberties as directly dependent on the 
restrictions placed upon pro-religious women. In a fundamental way, reproduces the hierarchal 
status quo of the political spheres in Turkey as well as the singular authoritarian nature of the 
modernization project. How can one conceive of a liberty that is dependent on the restrictions 
placed upon another group of women? Perhaps this liberty is only a "privileged liberty," which 
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will only reproduce patriarchal hierarchies and ultimately lead to greater gender discrimination 
within the society. 
The secular feminist position "tends to be maximalist when it comes to formal positions," 
which distinctly resembles the authoritarian stance of the republican era government (Fisher-
Onar & Paker 2012 p. 14). The influence of the Kemalist political environment and direct 
government influence have significantly shaped the discourses within the feminist movement 
throughout the decades. Most recently, a distinct cleavage within the movement between secular 
and pro-religious women has developed, especially over the headscarf issue. Ultimately 
particular groups of pro-religious woman are marginalized due to the hierarchal secular strain of 
ideology dominant in the feminist movement; labeling pro-religious women as too distinctly 
different, as 'the other.' 
Similar to the reactions of secular and Kemalist women in Turkey, secular feminists in the 
United States viewed religious women as part of the religious right that was developing. A 
general attitude of stereotyping conservative religious women by lumping them under the 
category of the "New Religious Right." During the 1980s the political sphere saw the rise offar 
right groups, motivated by religion. Liberal secular feminist viewed this as a direct attack on 
their rights (Petchesky 1981; Solinger 2005). The lack of any conservative religious women's 
perspectives in the mainstream movement inherently placed them with the 'New Religious 
Right' (May 20 I 0). As the 'new religious right' began to organize based on social issues and 
integrated themselves into the fiscally conservative republicans, women's issues became a 
dividing line between who was with them and who was against them. 
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1980 was the year that for the first time, the Republican Party declared its opposition to the 
ERA and moral condemnation of abortion (Rosen 2000). It was with the, "Reagan presidency, 
[that] campaign activists in both parties developed distinct and divergent positions on 
abortion" (Carmine and Wood 2002, p. 370). Right-wing politicians have used the issue of 
reproductive rights and abortion as a main issue that symbolizes their ideological positioning. It 
was, "Abortion [and reproductive rights that] - became a primary vehicle through which right-
wing politicians achieved their ascent to state power in the late 1970s and the 1980 
elections" (Petchesky 1981, p. 207). Women's rights, especially reproductive rights were used by 
the 'New Right' as the liberal secular 'other' with which they defined themselves in opposition 
with (Petchesky 1981; Solinger 2005). It is clear within many political debates in the United 
States that women's rights, especially abortion and reproductive rights, have become markers or 
symbols of larger ideological positions. 
Liberal secular feminists negatively reacted to the rise of conservatism in the United States, 
rightly so fearing the reversal of Roe v. Wade. However, pro-religious women somehow became 
agents of the radical right. In many quarters, among both conservatives and liberals, 
"individuals' views regarding women's roles are used as a litmus test to determine whether the 
person is 'one of us' or 'on of them'" (Ingersoll 2003, p. 15). Now women have been pitted 
against each other in an ideological battle that is no longer about women's rights. Fundamentalist 
groups in the United States have always existed as they have in Turkey. However, those 
fundamentalist groups in both countries have existed on the fringes of politics and society. The 
difference in the United States is that there was an accepted group of progressive religious 
women before the 1980s backlash. Unlike previous groups, the 'second wave' fundamentalists of 
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the 1980s were and, "are sophisticated players in contemporary media culture and have become 
adept at promoting a culturally current public image" (Brasher 1998, p. 23). Essentially it was in 
this era that radical conservatives became politically savvy and reproductive rights got caught in 
the middle of it all. As reproductive rights became a litmus test for the emerging ideological 
debates, women began to take sides based on their 'thick identities of secular or pro-religious. 
Petchesky's (1981) article is charged with highly political, one sided language that does not 
recognize the diversity of religious women. Her language provides an example of how many 
women took a maximalist stance and viewed contested issues such as abortion (and reproductive 
rights) solely through the lens of their particularistic identities. Others in the United States have 
used the term 'absolutist,' to describe the ideological positioning of elite groups on both the right 
and the left (Strickler and Danigelis 2002; Tribe 1992; Luker 1984) However true it may be that, 
"a key element in the Right's strategy was to use the churches and particularly the "right-to-life" 
movement as an organizational model and base" (Petchesky 1981, p. 212). By not explaining or 
recognizing pro-religious women's diverse perspectives, she implicitly lumps them under her 
category of 'new religious right,' reinforcing maximalist rhetoric about abortion. 12 The absence 
of any pro-religious women's perspectives conflates their identity with radical leaders and 
continues the dichotomous line of secular liberal and conservative religious into the feminist 
movement. It has become all too clear that American society and the state are plunging day by 
day more deeply into right-wing reactionism"(1981, p. 206). While there has been a distinct 
12 Somewhere within her rhetoric lies the liberal secular assumption that no woman would have ethical issues with 
reproductive rights, as argued by conservative religious leaders. This assumption alienates pro-religious women, as 
they may agree with these leaders on a few topics, but generally have a more ambivalent position between the two 
poles. 
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development of a political religious right wing since the 1980s, it is reactionary in itself to 
describe this movement as engulfing the entirety of the nation. 
The advancing influence of religion in politics is certainly worrying in a secular democracy, 
liberal feminist have viewed the rise of the New Right as a direct backlash to their liberation. The 
New Right may not have been a direct backlash, rather this was a politically opportune moment 
for the far right to organize religiously motivated leaders, gaining a voter base and political 
legitimacy (Manning 1999). Reproductive rights became the moment, "for the traditionalists -
politically organized as the New Right - to define and organize their 'crusade"'(Solinger 2005, p. 
205). What the New Right saw was a general degradation of society and loss of religious values. 
What they wanted was a return to traditionalist views. Liberal feminist articles then developed an 
understanding of religious women as a group being the 'foot soldiers' of this movement 
(Solinger 2005; Petchesky 1981). Pro-religious women are often depicted as furthering the goals 
of fundamentalist men, thus positioned as the enemy (Brasher 1998). It was assumed that pro-
religious women directly supported or were co-opted by the use of religious networks in the rise 
of the 'New Right.' In the United States feminist never fully left liberal political culture behind, 
creating further divisions. Turkish feminists meanwhile, never fully left behind the national 
narrative of Kemalism, reinforcing divisions that had always existed. 
Contemporary Debates: The Headsearf and Abortion 
The headscarf issue became prominent throughout the 1980s, ideological lines were 
drawn. During the 80s and 90s, a growing political movement was emerging. A conservative 
Islamist faction had solidified and came to a head with the Virtue Party, which had significant 
support (Atacan 2005). While the headscarf issue simmered through the decade and was widely 
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discussed, creating divisions, it was not until 1999 when the issue made its way onto the national 
political stage. A woman from the Virtue Party had been elected to parliament, surprising since 
women's representation in government has hovered around 9% (Jelen 2011). Merve Kavakci was 
highly educated and a prominent leader within the party, she also happened to wear a headscarf. 
Ultimately, she was forbidden to swear into office wearing the headscarf, the Virtue Party was 
later ruled as unconstitutional and Kavakci's citizenship was revoked (Jelen 2011). As women's 
organizations had begun to align themselves on either side of an ideological divide, This 
development posed a serious democratic conundrum for the contemporary women of Turkey. At 
the same time many women perceived the spread of conservative values, women were very 
active in those conservative organizations. A clear conflict for women's rights then is how to 
reconcile what has been posited as irreconcilable, women's rights and religion. 
Yet many Kemalist and secular women view the issue strictly though their particularistic 
lens. They would make the argument that if secularism was a necessary foundation of democracy 
and women rights, then the election of any pro-religious individual would be contrary to the 
progression of women's rights. While the headscarfhad gradually become a symbol of 
fundamentalism over the decades, "It wasn't until the AKP introduced the headscarf issue did 
women's rights organizations begin to define themselves along Islamists vs. Laicists" (Co~ar & 
Gen\,oglu-Onba~l. 2008, p. 326). The divisions had always existed, growing stronger throughout 
the 80s and 90s, but here in the contemporary debates we see those ideological lines crystalize in 
all spheres of the polity. The headscarf issue was now distinctly a symbol through which, 
"different Turkish visions intensely clashed [and] ". again polarized the country along the same 
ideological lines"(Sozen 2008, p. 82). Now the headscarf ban was enforced in many public 
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places and politics had once again become polarized, the eye of the storm converging over the 
headscarf issue. Women's organizations explicitly defined themselves along these ideological 
lines and women take a stance of secular or pro-religious on many issues. 
While women's organizations themselves still come together, brining women from diverse 
backgrounds to work on the most salient issues for women (domestic violence, education, 
empowerment), there are clear dividing lines due to the headscarf debate that make working 
together difficult. The Islamic movement and dividing line between pro-religious and secular 
women demonstrate main cleavages within the movement, "inhibiting participation in common 
platforms and interaction among WROs" (Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012, p. 13).13 Essentially this is 
secular women's skepticism for pro-religious women's concerns and opinions. While there are 
platforms that include a wide range of women, there are also those that exclude pro-religious 
women, such as the Equality Watch Platform (Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012). Secular women 
continue to display hierarchal and hegemonic attitudes, assuming all women who cover do so 
because of male pressure rather than of their own volition (Fisher-Onar & Paker 2012). This has 
the affect of excluding pro-religious women who generally support a wide range of women's 
rights and yet view wearing the headscarf as an issue of religious freedom. 
Issues with exclusion of pro-religious women may in part stem from the fact that very few 
stable WRO's for pro-religious women exist. Out of 6 WROs analyzed in a case study, only one 
thought that veiling was not a major violation of women's rights (Co~ar & Gen90glu-Onba~1 
2008). There is a lack of pro-religious representation in the women's movement due to the 
ideological divide that permeated Turkish politics and society. Despite the few WROs who 
13 Women's Rights Organizations are often abbreviated into WRO and 'Platforms' are initiative's that multiple 
WRO's work on, writing reports or holding conferences. For example the "women's coalition for elections 
initiative" which brought together a wide range of WRO's to push political parties to nominate female candidates. 
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acknowledge wearing the headscarf as freedom of religion, figures vary but it is estimated that 
currently (2007) about 69% of women cover, or identifY as covered women (Jelen 20 II). All 
these factors have the affect of explicitly or implicitly marginalizing pro-religious women from 
participating in the larger feminist movement. The cause stems from the dividing lines that have 
been present but increasingly prevalent in Turkish politics and social life since it's founding. 
Marginalization of pro-religious women and the 'single-issue' cleavage in the movement has 
stunted the progress of women's rights as a whole. 
The reality of these debates is that they have exacerbated the tangible discrimination for 
Turkish pro-religious women who cover. Pro-religious women face discrimination in all public 
spheres, finding it difficult to pursue higher education (only -14 universities tolerate the 
headsear£), difficult to find jobs especially those with opportunities and are often paid less than 
their non-covered female counterparts (Jelen 2011). "In addition to consciously not hiring hijabi 
women, even when they are highly qualified for the position, many private companies will limit 
these women to certain positions where they are not in contact with the public and where they 
are invisible" (Jelen 20 II, p. 313). Those women are seen as a liability because the headscarf 
within the ideological debates represents "backwards" conservative values. This proves a serious 
problem for women's equality and participation in the workforce as a slight majority of women 
are covered and increasingly more covered women graduate from university. The fact that 
covered women are excluded from 'male' spheres has only reinforced gender inequality and 
difference as discrimination against one group of women is discrimination against all. In Turkey, 
not only does the ideological divide segregate women, marginalizing and excluding pro-religious 
women, it does nothing for the enhancement of women's rights. 
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While in both countries it become obvious how political ideological battles divide women 
by their 'thick' particularistic identities. More difficult to pull out is that these debates are now 
almost exclusively a political ideological battle despite the assertion that abortion and headscarf 
debates are women's issues. Although these issues are associated with women's rights, the battle 
between secular left and religious right does nothing for the advancement of women's rights. 
Because neither ideology can guarantee women's rights, while religion is not the ultimate 
oppressor of women, neither is secularism the guardian of women's rights. The debates as they 
stand, in the long run are not productive for the enhancement of women's rights, women are 
fighting each other in a battle that is not their own. Through recognizing each other's differences 
along this divide, moving beyond it to define issues on their own terms, women have the 
capability to build feminist solidarity cross-identity. 
The reality for women finding solidarity beyond 'thick' particularistic identities of secular 
and pro-religious seems a long way off, as the battle of polarized ideologies permeates life in the 
political and social. Important for building solidarity is understanding each other's particularistic 
identity and finding common experiences of women, issues all women can rally round. "Where 
abortion [reproductive rights] had ignited feminist hearts in many Western countries, domestic 
violence activated feminists of different persuasions in Turkey" (Arat 1998, p. 119). The 
differences remain clear, as in the US the issue that rallied women also began to divide them. In 
Turkey it is the opposite reality as the issue that rallies women is still the issue that maintains 
solidarity as women. The glimmer of hope for Turkish women to find solidarity grows stronger 
as Platforms can unite women, organizations on either side of the divide still work on the same 
issues through comparable methods. In the United States the commonality may be harder to see 
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and solidarity harder to build as the polarized debate not only divides women, it divides politics 
all of politics as a whole, thus much better as disguising women's common experiences. Before 
we can come to a definitive answer on the possibility of women finding solidarity in both 
countries, the particularistic identities of pro-religious women must be better understood. 
In the United States during the 80s, abortion and reproductive rights became an ideological 
symbol for both sides of the argument. Secular feminists viewed it as a symbol of freedom and 
self determination. Pro-religious women on the other hand, had a worldview in which 
motherhood was the highest calling, thus abortion was a 'mothers issue' (Stavrianos 2008; Luker 
1984). During the 80s, this particular world view has been used by organizations and politicians 
to rally a religiously conservative voter base. Since 2000 however, their tone has changed and 
pro-life, "proponents have made increasing use of rhetoric that focuses on the 'rights' of 'unborn 
children'" (Satvrianos 2008). As particular groups of conservatives have moved even farther to 
the right, a new campaign against abortion has been launched. One that targets restrictions on 
abortion at the state level and seems to be leaving behind the motherhood concerns of many pro-
religious women. 
As the symbol of the abortion in the United States has developed into an ideological debate 
between religious conservatives and secular liberal groups, women's rights have been sidelined. 
Right to life groups have argued for the sanctity of life while liberal groups view restricting 
abortion as restricting individual liberties. The ideological 'battle' is taking place at the state 
level while both sides hold maximalist positions on the debate. Organizations like the, National 
Right to Life Committee has supported and pursued state legislation that creates barriers for 
women. For example, Senator Tony Fulton is a sponsor of a legislative proposal in Nebraska that 
would require women to be shown an ultrasound image of the fetus prior to having an abortion 
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(Gold 2009). Wrapped in a cloak of 'sanctity' for life and religious rhetoric, pro-life politicians 
and leading organizations have tried to rally a conservative religious base to get behind their 
cause and restrict abortion on the state level. 
The shift into state level restrictions on abortion started in 2000 with an increasing number 
of states implementing severe restrictions on abortion access. Oklahoma was one of the first to 
adopt legislation stating that a woman must have an ultrasound before an abortion and a, 
"physician must review the image with the woman; the legislation explicitly mandates that, if she 
chooses, the woman be permitted to 'avert her eyes'(Gold 2009). Political absolutist rhetoric on 
both sides increased over the decade as more states imposed restrictions. By 2011, a core group 
of states had passed 135 new 'reproductive health' provisions, the most of any year since Roe V. 
Wade passed (Gold and Nash 2012). These polarized debates have reached a stalemate within the 
last decade and are attempting to make inches of headway at the state level. While this battle 
rages on, one has to wonder if the perspectives that abound in politics actually represents the vast 
majority of women. 
The 'culture war,' with abortion as it's leading symbol, is an elite political phenomenon, 
driven by groups of activists on the left and right who influence the electorate. As Fiorina (2010) 
and others have argued, the average citizen is moderate and generally ambivalent in their 
political beliefs (Treier and Hillygus 2009) This is especially true for women as the vast majority 
of individuals beliefs are never consistently pro-choice or pro-life (Strickler and Danigelis 2002). 
Analyzing self-identified democrats and republicans, it seems that there has been a shift to either 
side. However, this polarization is much more apparent in activists who participate in politics 
than the average citizen (Carmine and Wood 2002). Further, the majority still remain in the 
center, whether by choice or 'pushed' by competing factors (Treier and Hillygus 2009). The 
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absolutist rhetoric on both sides has divided 'elites,' symbolically dividing the nation and 
women. Abortion has merely become,"a salient party cleavage issue, perhaps the most prominent 
issue difference between the parties (Carmine and Wood 2002). Even among those analyzing the 
polarization of U.S. politics, abortion is a key variable used to expose true 'divisions' in society. 
Abortion attitudes have become deeply associated with party identification, becoming a 
permanent feature of politics in the U.S. No longer merely a woman's issue, it has become an 
identifier of political ideology. 
As such, the progression of women's rights has been stalled. In current politics, reproductive 
rights have become a channel through which particular 'thick' worldview can be espoused. In the 
midst of these debates pro-religious women have fully entered into,"a double bind as the 
marginalized of the marginalized" (Brasher 1998, p. 89). These women are viewed as part of a 
'backwards,' portion of society. Further understood as the unwilling and co-opted to perpetuate a 
particular ideology. These divisions, while existing earlier in the movement, never ultimately 
divided women. In previous decades, these ideological positions were secondary to the goal of 
gender equality and women's rights. The political change over the past three decades has created 
abortion as a symbol of 'thick' particularistic identity, causing divisions between women to 
become crystalized. 
The Reality of Women's Experiences, Beyond Categorization and Building Solidarity 
Contemporary women have incredibly diverse experiences, values and opinions, which 
move beyond the boundaries of current categorization. Often women's individuals experiences 
are overlapping as women from secular and pro-religious camps have much more in common 
than they do different. The current debates and polarized political ideologies are not 
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representative of women's experiences, women need to move beyond these debates and define 
democracy, modernity and the important issues for women on their own terms. Building feminist 
solidarity between women starts with recognizing differences and thus eventually realizing the 
commonality. In both countries one can see how pro-religious women have begun to reinterpret 
religion, creating their own understanding of modernity and incorporating feminist values into 
their daily lives. Through an understanding of women's 'thick' particularistic identities, we may 
find a common avenue for change, building an inclusive movement around the issues all women 
find imperative for women's rights. 
While pro-religious, covered women in Turkey are often seen as representing the 
resurgence of religious conservatism the reality is that these women have diverse experiences 
and usually have ambivalent attitudes towards the moderate Muslims in power. Currently 
holding office is the Justice and Development party (AKP), self described as moderate Muslims 
and founded in 2001 by many political leaders from the disbanded Virtue Party. The, "AKP elites 
are social engineers. In other words, unlike traditional conservatives the neo-conservative 
populists' claim to represent the contemporary values of the people ... " (Siizen 2008, p. 80). 
There are many pro-religious covered women who want to participate in politics, education and 
civil society and, "not necessarily to support the ideas that conservative men would like them 
to" (Jelen 2011, p. 313). The contemporary debates over the headscarf and the ideological battle 
played out by political parties do not necessarily represent the attitudes or beliefs of pro-religious 
women. Further, this divide is hiding the reality that many women's organization, regardless of 
ideological placement agree, and work on the same issues. 
Increasingly the number of covered women graduating from higher education and entering 
the workforce has sparked academic interest in investigating their lives and beliefs. While the 
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national statistic for women who are considered covered as remained stable at around 65%, the 
number of women who specifically wear the hijab has risen from 3.5% in 2003 to 16.3% in 2007 
(Jelen 2011). Overall the number of covered women who graduated from higher education was at 
26.6% in 2007, for comparative only 5.4% of Turkish women graduated from higher education 
in 2000 (Jelen 2011). Despite the headscarfban and the "dress and regulation code," the number 
of covered pro-religious women who are seeking higher education and employment 
opportunities is increasing. 
While some consider the headscarf a symbol of fundamentalism, the reality is that these 
women have incorporated feminist values into their daily lives. As a current university woman 
states, "As a woman it is specifically important to earn my own money, which in other words 
means to have strength. I believe it is not about being a Muslim or a non Muslim [ ... J I am a 
smart woman, I can make my own money, I do not want to be dependent on my family anymore, 
or on my future husband" (Jelen 2011, p. 311). Pro-religious women, especially when college 
educated have created new understandings of their identity, incorporating feminist values and 
beliefs into their life. Many pro-religious women have incorporated feminist values into their 
lives and by reinterpreting religious texts through a feminist lens, create new understandings of 
Islam. 
Some women even justified their desire to work and educated themselves through a 
reinterpretation of Islamic texts and Islam as a whole. One student states that she, "believe[ s J that 
everywoman has the right to stand on her own feet. It is hard to defy patriarchy today. As a 
Muslim hijabi woman, I think we need to break the taboo that Islam puts women in an inferior 
position, and I'll do my best to do so" (Jelen 2011, p. 311). Often pro-religious women in cite the 
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Islamic texts and biographies ofthe Prophet's wives Hatice (Khadijah) and Ayse (Aisha) who 
were both active outside of the home. Thus, reinterpreting religion through a feminist lens and 
actively incorporating those values into their daily life and experiences. One female student 
views education, entering the workforce and participation in society as a duty because she is a 
pro-religious covered woman. 
"Also I took the issue as a Jihad. IfI do not go to the university that I've 
deserved by winning the exam [OSS] ... then my place may be taken by 
someone who has nothing to do with religion. Thus in the end people who 
think and live like me will be excluded from intellectual society ... " (Jelen 
2011,p.312). 
What she is discussing is her unique blend of pro-religious and feminist perspectives, not 
necessarily the islamization of society as a whole. These pro-religious women's understandings 
of society have been marginalized in Turkey and thus, a large portion of women's perspectives. 
What the previous quote touches on is a very important issue for the women's movement in 
Turkey, as roughly 65% of women in Turkey are covered in some way. Generally speaking then, 
this means that a full 30% of the adult population in Turkey is excluded from civil society and 
the political sphere (Jelen 20 II). Due to the headscarf ban in public institutions and the limited 
higher education institutions that allow the headscarf, a large portion of the Turkish population is 
effectively excluded and discriminated against in society. This poses a serious issue for the 
women's movement as it becomes clear that the women's rights gained are, for all intents, 
merely rights for one particular group of women. If pro-religious women continue to be 
marginalized then women's rights will never progress in Turkey. You cannot have one group of 
women segregated, call social reformation "women's rights," as it clearly only affects a 
particular group of women who are capable of realizing those rights. 
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In the United States many pro-religious women have incorporated feminist values into their 
daily life: supporting a diverse platform of workplace equality issues, sexual assault and violence 
issues as well as contraceptive use (Manning 1999). As Brasher has shown, pro-religious women 
find empowerment within the gender binaries of their religious communities, creating 'female 
enclaves' as support systems, reinterpreting biblical texts, and generally influencing 
congregational life (1998). Additionally, secular women in the United States have much more 
diverse opinions and ambivalent understandings of abortion, often having moral and ethical 
issues personally, while promoting women's right to choice (May 2010). Particularistic groups of 
women's have plenty of common interests that are merely hidden by political rhetoric. 
Polarization of the debate has divided women along particularistic identity lines of liberal secular 
and conservative religious (Treier and Hillygus 2009). Once understanding these common held 
experiences, that many secular and pro-religious women share common beliefs, these labels 
seem frivolous. 
Despite what has been considered the backlash of the 1980s, it seems that religious 
conservative communities have unconsciously absorbed and incorporated many feminist values. 
Many religious women use feminist values to justifY their work outside the home, or the identity 
of being a single mother (Manning 1999; Ingersoll 2003). Furthermore, the restrictive religious 
identity pro-religious women embrace allows them to better direct the course their lives (Brasher 
1998). Essentially, women empower themselves through a religious transformation, taking 
control of their lives in a meaningful way. Through interviews with religious women, Manning 
demonstrates how pro-religious women negotiate multiple identities, often incorporating feminist 
values into their daily lives. For example Katrina, a head nurse discusses her job, "It's not your 
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sex that's going to show through, it's your integrity as a person" (Manning 1999, p. 8). Religious 
women often compartmentalize their life into two areas, the secular feminist public sphere of 
work and the religious private sphere of the home. This allows them to negotiate multiple 
identities and resolve moral qualms that are generally thought of as incompatible. 
If you take the structures of religious organizations at face value, then you conflate power 
and authority. Looking at congregational governance, men are privileged over women (Brasher 
1998). As noted by Ingersoll those power dynamics should not be ignored, many women feel 
limited and discounted in traditional religions (2003). Yet in terms of religious values, "equality 
of gender prevailed" (Brasher 1998, p. 61). It is, "alongside the male-dominated symbolic world 
of overall congregational life exists a parallel symbolic world administered totally by 
women" (Brasher 1998, p. 19). These are what Brasher describes as, female enclaves. 
Negotiating around the gender binary constraints of the congregation, they construct women 
only, bible studies, prayer sessions, and support groups. Through these groups and the conversion 
into religion has created, "narratives [that] psychologically construct for them a certain 
freedom" (Brasher 1998, p. 56). It is through their relationship with God and support network of 
female enclaves that pro-religious women improve the quality of their daily lives and find 
empowerment. What becomes clear through these studies is that some women do find 
empowerment through religion and the diversity of women's lives are revealed. As a wide 
variety of thick identities are better understood, possibilities for building solidarity become 
clearer. 
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The religious women Manning interviews strongly support equal rights legislation within the 
workplace, often agreeing with contemporary opinions that the feminist movement. 14 There are 
even some religious women who, may not completely support all reproductive rights, but who 
question the Catholic church's strict stance on abortion (Manning 1999, p. 25). Studies done on 
women's reactions to anti-abortion picketers while entering a clinic to obtain an abortion showed 
the majority of women identified with a religious group as 37% were Catholic and 43% were 
Protestant (Cozzarelli & Major 2000, p. 268). It becomes clear that conservative women have 
been influenced by feminist norms. While 'antifeminist' sentiments may be more common in 
religious traditions, there exist alternative voices that argue for gender equality (Ingersoll 2003) 
and empowerment (Brasher 1998). This is a key point in the research, indicating that while 
abortion may be a polarized stalemate debate, there is room for women to negotiate around these 
issues and find common ground on which a cohesive women's movement may be built. So long 
as groups of secular and pro-religious women do not view the 'other' solely through their 
'thick,' particularistic identities. In reality, women's experiences and perspectives are not quite so 
dichotomous, many secular women still find moral dilemma's with birth control and abortion 
while pro-religious women are actively incorporating feminist values of the public sphere into 
their daily lives. 
Women have seen a dramatic shift in contemporary American politics, while Turkish 
women have seen political upheaval and a move towards the conservative right. This path has led 
to the rise of the new right to the extreme polarization of liberal secular and conservative 
religious ideological camps. This polarization in politics has divided the women's movement 
\4 Due to the increased polarization oflhe political sphere, only caricatures of both sides are presented. Thus either 
group of women will not fully understand the ambivalent stance of the other. 
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along those ideological lines. Dividing the women's movement in such a manner has 
marginalized pro-religious women from the mainstream movement. Secular feminists of both 
countries often view those who are not actively combatting patriarchy as complicit or reinforcing 
oppressive norms. As Brasher (1998) points out the religious women she studies are not couriers 
of oppressive fundamentalism but rather engage in active and passive bargaining with patriarchy 
(Kandiyoti, 1988). As Kandiyoti has argued around the globe, as well as in the Turkish context, 
women find strategies to negotiate within concrete constraints (1988). All women work within 
the 'patriarchal bargain,' which, "may exhibit variations according to class, caste, and 
ethnicity" (Kandiyoti 1988, p. 275). I would argue that in both countries, pro-religious women 
are not complicit actors, but rather negotiators. 
Political labels do not represent the diversity of either group of women, nor could they 
represent the intricate overlapping identities of individual women. Therefore it is up to women to 
transcend political debates and categories to achieve justice that serves the vast majority. Women 
need to stop fighting the battle between secular and religious ideologies because neither can fully 
represent women's experiences or identities. Together, women have the unique opportunity to 
find common interests through mutual recognition and understanding comparable experiences. 
One method to build solidarity between women is a reorganization of the women's movement so 
that all voices can be heard and all arguments tested. Organized as a 'congress of grievances' 
with high participation and great value placed on deliberation women will be able to negotiate 
their multiple identities within overlapping communities (Mill 1869, Held 2005). By creating a 
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